Foreign Policies of Northern Europe by Bengt Sundelius

Author:Bengt Sundelius [Sundelius, Bengt]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367018610
Google: pgVBxgEACAAJ
Goodreads: 52432761
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-06-07T00:00:00+00:00

The Atlantic Dimension

The introduction of a specific Atlantic level in U.S. policy gradually superseding global aims left its impact also on the Nordic countries. Secretary of State Marshall's proposals for a European Recovery Program (ERP) were interpreted by the East European countries as an aggravating bloc-building move. ERP also met with some suspicion among the Nordic countries. For a while these countries supported the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the ECE. Norway was perhaps the most reluctant party, defending the priority of all-European efforts.8 After the firm French-British invitation and the inception of the Paris talks in 1947, these sentiments gradually evaporated.

The walkout of the East-European countries led by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov meant that these nations abstained from taking part in the ERP. Finland postponed its decision until all other nations had made their positions known. Bearing in mind the harsh Soviet reaction to the interest revealed by the Czechoslovakian government prior to the February coup, the issue was not raised. The Finnish attitude might serve as a first example of an anticipation policy coupled with a delaying "wait and see" strategy.9 Caution prevailed also in the all-European field. Although still not a member of the United Nations, Finland joined the ECE as a nonvoting member in 1949.

The Finnish position differed from that taken by the other Nordic countries and also by other neutral nations. Criticism by the Soviet Union was bluntly rejected by these countries. U.S. aid was declared to be an economic matter directed at hunger and poverty and open to all European countries. The exclusion of political military aims paved the way for the construction of a somewhat pluralistic intergovernmental organization. In reality, it seems that the leading powers took great pains to extend the organization's work as widely as possible.

Although GATT defined the overall rules of trade diplomacy and the IMF defined the rules of monetary exchange, the principles formulated by those bodies were most effectively implemented by regional organizations. The global aim of nondiscrimination was intentionally eroded by Article 24 of GATT, exempting the formation of free-trade areas and customs unions. This fact formally facilitated the formation of the EC and EFTA. Trade liberalization and the introduction of convertible currencies were greatly facilitated by the ambitious OEEC program for the 1950s. Over 90 percent of trade was multilateral toward the end of the decade. The clearinghouse of the European Payment Union was also instrumental in the rapid growth in the European economies. The recovery sustained the U.S. lead in maintaining the regime and made it easier for the Nordic countries to ignore ambitious continental plans for economic and political coordination.

Once again, Finland had to keep up with the main currents by circumscribing and conditioning its participation. A basis for abandoning Finland's bilateral trade with Western Europe and for granting Finland preferential access to these countries was reached first with the "Helsinki Club" agreement of 1957. Gradually Finland expanded its activities in different OEEC/OECD organs. In 1969, the time was finally ripe for complete membership.

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